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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
and pursuant to Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Rule 4A. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to hear cases transferred from the Supreme Court as 
provided by the above statute and by the above rule 
of the Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OP THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal for a Writ of Review from 
the final Order and Judgment given to the Respondent 
Corporation, that denied Appellant enforcement and 
damages for breach of contract and breach of warranty, 
granted by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, presiding 
District Court Judge of Weber County, State of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The Respondent Corporation through the 
Respondent Irey, practiced engineering in the state 
of Utah without an engineering license in violation 
of Chapter 22 of Title 58 of the Utah Code. 
2. The Respondent Corporation is barred 
from using the court system in the state of Utah for 
recovery of any sums due in connection with the 
unauthorized practice of professional engineering 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 58-22-20. 
3. The Respondent Corporation did not allege 
in its Counterclaim that the practice of engineering 
was carried on by professional engineers authorized 
to practice under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 58-22-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). 
4. It is an error in law for the District 
Court to disallow a breach of warranty jury instruction 
when one of Appellant's claims is for breach of 
warranty. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated Title 58, Chapter 22, 
Sections 2 and 20 (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the Appellant 
against the Respondent Corporation and Irey for breach 
of contract and breach of warranty for Respondent's 
manufacturing for the Appellant, an automatic terminal 
bolt-to-coil assembly machine under specific 
specifications, (R. l-4r 122-128) . 
Respondent Corporation cdunterclaimed for 
damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. 
(R. 108-118). 
Appellant further claimed as an affirmative 
defense, that Respondent Corporation acted through 
its only employee, Respondent Irey, who was not a 
licensed engineer and therefore unable to maintain 
an action. (R. 120 and 121). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT 
BELOW 
Trial of this action was to a jury who awarded 
the Respondent Corporation damages against the Appellant 
in the amount of $92,500.00 together with accrued 
interest of $23,895.81, and costs of $285.45. (R. 
323, 324 and 325). 
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Prior to trialf Appellant moved for Dismissal 
of Respondent's Counterclaim pursuant to a Motion 
for Summary Judgment based upon the fact that Respondent 
Ireyf dba the Respondent Corporation, was not a licensed 
engineer. (R. 129 through 139, 141 through 153). 
The Motion was heard before the Honorable 
David E. Roth and the Motion denied pending evidence 
to be submitted at trial concerning material issues 
of fact. (R. 168 and 169)(Reporter!s Transcript p. 
6) (See Appendix C). 
The Motion was renewed at the time of trial 
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist and denied 
as having been decided by the other District Court 
Judge, the Honorable David E. Roth. (Reporter's 
Transcript p. 3 through 7, 16 through 19) (See Appendix 
C). 
Prior to the case being submitted to the 
jury, the Appellant took exception to the court's 
failure to submit to the jury an instruction on breach 
of warranty. (Reporter's Transcript p. 20)(See Appendix 
C). 
Appellant appeals the denial of an Order 
of Dismissal of Respondent's Counterclaim pursuant 
to the above Motions, the court's failure to submit 
- 8 -
a jury instruction on breach of warranty to the jury 
and the courtfs allowing the Respondent's Counterclaim 
without complying with U.C.A., Sections 58-22-2 and 
20. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 2, 1982, Industrial 
Engineering and Manufacturing Corporation, of which 
the Respondent Irey was the president and owner, agreed 
to manufacture for Appellant an automatic terminal 
bolt-to-coil assembly machine under specific 
specifications. (R. 1, 2r 122f 123). The machine 
was to be capable of applying a stud to both ends 
of various diameter coils at a minimum rate of 600 
coils per hour or as later modified to 400 coils per 
hour. (R. 34). 
At the time of entering into the contract 
to manufacture the assembly machine, the Respondent 
Irey was not licensed to practice engineering in the 
state of Utah. (R. 130). 
That Respondent Irey has no license to 
practice his claimed profession of engineering, no 
college degree, no formal education to produce the 
machine he promised. (R. 130). 
Respondent Corporation had Joseph W. Lindsey, 
a self employed licensed engineer, review some aspects 
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of previous designs completed by the Respondent Irey. 
(R. 145)(Reporterfs Transcript of Joseph W. Lindsey 
p. 2, 7 and 24). Mr. Lindsey1 s relationship and 
affiliation with the Respondent Corporation, Respondent 
Ireyf and the project to manufacture the assembly 
machine can be found in his testimony at trial. (See 
Appendix B, Reporter's Transcript of Joseph Lindsey 
p. 24, 25 and 29). Please note the following testimony: 
Q. If the machine wasn't working properly, then 
you consider yourself responsible for that machine, 
Mr. Lindsey? 
A. I did not consider myself responsible for whether 
or not the machine works. Again, as I explained 
to you in Deposition and today, that is not a 
part of the certification. Certification only 
certifies to the strengths, to the proper choice 
of materials, the proper methods— 
Q. You've made no certifications to this machine 
by any certified drawings, have you? 
A. I have not stamped any drawings. I — not 
certified in that sense. 
Q. You have not — 
A. But my approval is the same thing. 
Q. You have not made any drawings on this particular 
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machine, isn't that true? 
A. I don't ordinarily do drafting, no. 
Q. Isn't it true that Mr. Irey would design itr 
then bring it to you for your review of the items 
that were — you've talked about? 
A. That's correct in most cases. That I would review 
a design that was already done. And suggest 
whatever modifications that I felt were required 
to make better use of materials or to strengthen 
a part of required — in that capacity. 
Q# Nowf initially he came to you and you went with 
a chalk board talk on the machine, I guess, is 
that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. That was for design of the framed 
A. He initially came to me with the entire concept. 
We broke it down into various functions, looked 
at modules that would be required to accomplish 
it. 
Q0 Was that initially on the blackboard is how you 
did that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In that review procession — or that process, 
was anything designed I guess by Mr. Irey and 
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you reviewed it after that process? 
0hf I'm sure there were a lot of cases where 
he made the suggestion and some where I made 
the suggestion I'm sure that's possible, Yes, 
As I understand, you're not an employee of 
Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing? 
That's correct. 
You're not an officer of Industrial Engineering 
and Manufacturing? 
That's correct. 
Did you ever meet with anybody at Pacific Chromalox 
concerning the machine? 
No, I did not. 
So as to different gauge coils, different size 
diameters, different lengths, you performed no 
projection test with those other than the ones 
you observed him having in the shop which are 
the — I guess the 25, 24, 26 area? 
I never conducted any tests with the machine. 
Maybe I asked you this, I apologize, did you 
make any drawings or designs at all for the 
machine? 
Not directly, No. 
The foregoing was direct testimony from 
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Joseph W. Lindsey. 
That in excess of a year following the 
entering into the agreement by the parties, Respondent 
Corporation and Irey delivered to Appellant the assembly 
machine which had been manufactured. (R. 2, 123). 
That the assembly machine did not fulfill 
the requirements set forth in the contract specification 
and did not operate properly. (R. 2, 123). The machine 
never produced 600 coils per hour or as later modified, 
400 coils per hour and was always jamming. (R. 46 
through 54). Mr. Lindsey only timecj the seconds per 
cycle to produce a coil at 7.14 secdnds. Mr. Lindsey 
then stated that is about 505 parts per hour. However, 
Mr. Lindsey never tested the machine on a continuous 
basis and never saw more than 20 to 30 coils run at 
a time. Mr. Lindsey testified that in 1984 the machine 
was operating down around 200 to 250 parts per hour. 
(See Appendix B, Reporter's Transcript of Joseph Lindsey 
p. 14, 15 and 28. ) 
That subsequent thereto, Respondent removed 
the machine from Appellant's place of business in 
order that the equipment could be modified to operate 
in accordance with the specific conditions previously 
set. That the Respondent has been paid in full, the 
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amount of $73f389.75f under the terms of the contract. 
(R. 2f 123)(Appendix D, Plaintiff, Appellant's Exhibit 
40P) . 
That on or about May 21, 1985, Appellant 
received a Writ of Attachment and Replevin for 
possession of the assembly machine. That on or about 
November 6, 1985, Appellant filed an Amended Complaint 
and Respondent filed a Counterclaim on December 12
 r 
1985. (R. 2, 123). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent Irey seeks to recover for 
services and materials rendered as a professional 
engineer, doing business as, Industrial Engineering 
and Manufacturing Corporation. At the time of entering 
into the contract to manufacture the assembly machine, 
the Respondent Irey was the only employee of the 
Respondent Corporation and was not licensed to practice 
engineering in the state of Utah. (R, 130). In order 
for the Respondents to state a claim, they must allege 
and prove that at the time the work was performed 
and the materials furnished, there was a licensed 
engineer under the laws of the state of Utah that 
was doing the work and responsible for the project. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-22-20, 
provides in relevant part that "no person shall bring 
or maintain any action in the courts of this state 
for enforcement of any contract or the recovery of 
any sums due in connection with the practice of 
engineering...without alleging and proving that he 
was duly authorized to practice under the provisions 
of this act." 
The purpose and public policy behind this 
licensing statute and others like it are explained 
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in George v. Oren Limited and Associates, 672, P.2d 
732 (Utah 1983). The Supreme Court stated its general 
rule and policy that licensing statutes are clearly 
enacted for the purpose of protecting the public against 
inept and financially irresponsible builders. This 
case dealt with the requirement that contractors receive 
a license at the time of building. The Court went 
on to explain as follows: 
If the purpose of licensing is 
to protect the public, then the 
general rule in this state is 
that the party who does not obtain 
a license, but is required to 
do so, cannot obtain relief to 
enforce the terms of his contract, 
including payment thereunder, 
even though there are other 
penalties imposed against him 
expressly by statute, including 
criminal sanction...and there 
is no doubt that the purpose of 
the licensing statute relating 
to contractors is protection of 
the public. 
The licensing of engineers would also be 
expressly for the protection of the public. This 
general rule and policy in the state of Utah is further 
asserted in the following cases: 
Fillmore Products, Inc., v. Western States 
Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977), Meridian 
Corp. v. McGlynn and Garmaker Co., 567 P.2d 1110 
(Utah 1977), Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 
- 16 -
733 (1948) and Heber Valley Truckr Inc., v. Utah Coal 
and Energy, Inc., 611 P.2d 389 (Utah 1980). 
The Respondents did not allege in their 
Counterclaim that work was carried on by employees 
duly licensed to practice engineering pursuant to 
U.C.A. 58-22-20. (R. 108 through 118). The 
Corporation's only employee, the Respondent Irey, 
had no formal education in engineering, had no college 
degree and had no license to practice engineering 
in the state of Utah or in any other state. (Depo. 
p. 3)(R. 130 and 131). The statute gives the 
Respondents the burden to allege and prove that they 
have complied with the statute that requires 
supervision, responsibility and work be performed 
by a licensed engineer or that they come under an 
exception to the general rule. 
The Respondent Corporation attempts to 
circumvent the statute by alleging that a self employed, 
licensed engineer, Joseph Lindsey, was responsible 
for the project. However, Mr. Lindsey was not an 
employee or officer of the Respondent Corporation. 
Mr. Lindsey did not make any drawings or designs for 
the project. Mr. Lindsey did not consider himself 
responsible for whether the machine worked and never 
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conducted any tests with the machine. Mr. Lindsey 
never met with anybody at Pacific Chromalox, the 
Appellant, concerning the machine. (See Appendix 
Bf Reporter's Transcript of Joseph W. Lindsey, p. 
24, 25 and 29). Mr. Lindsey merely reviewed some 
aspects of the project previously designed by the 
Respondent Irey. Mr. Lindsey was not supervising 
nor responsible for the project. He was not a party 
to the contract. (See Appendix B, Reporter1s Transcript 
of Joseph W. Lindsey, p. 24). 
The Respondent's informal and sporadic 
consultations with Mr. Lindsey in reviewing some aspects 
of previous designs completed by the Respondent Irey 
would not comply with Utah statute nor evade the 
requirement that the Respondent Corporation have 
responsibility, supervision and work performed by 
a licensed engineer. The general rule of law is found 
in Bronold v. Enqler, 194 N.Y. 232, 87 N.E. 427 
(1909), involving a statute requiring the licensing 
of plumbers, where the court held that a statutory 
requirement of a license as a prerequisite to recovery 
on a contract, cannot be evaded by a firm that has 
no licensed member through the procedure of employing 
a licensed person to manage the business and enforce 
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its contracts, (51 Am. Jur. 2d Licenses and Permits, 
Section 68 (1970) . 
The Respondent Irey clearly held himself 
out through letters, contracts, actions and memorandum 
as a licensed engineering company and practiced 
engineering without a license on behalf of the 
Appellant. (R. 34). The mere title "Industrial 
Engineering and Manufacturing Company" projects a 
licensed engineering company. The requirement that 
the supervision, responsibility and work on the project 
be performed by a licensed engineer should not be 
evaded by the fact that Mr. Lindsey merely informally 
reviewed some plans previously Resigned by the 
Respondent Irey. 
The Respondents would have this court believe 
that this case comes under the exceptions to the general 
rule that requires supervision, responsibility and 
work be performed by a licensed engineer to protect 
the public against fraud, incompetence, illegality 
or irresponsibility as outlined in Fillmore Products, 
Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 
(Utah 1977) and Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1979) . 
However, the facts of this case are 
distinguished from the exceptions set out in these 
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two cases. 
The current case is distinguished from the 
Fillmore Products case, which also deals with a 
corporation, in that (1) the Respondents were not acting 
as a subcontractor to a party licensed as an engineer 
but Respondents were the contracting parties with 
the Appellant and were the only contracting parties 
responsible for the manufacturing of the machine and 
(2) the project was not under the supervision, direction 
or control of a licensed project engineer. Mr. Lindsey 
had no control, direction or supervision over the 
Respondents or responsibility for the project. (T. 
24, 25). 
The Lignell case is likewise distinguishable 
from the case before the court in the following: 
1. Respondent Irey did not "just 
inadvertently" allow his license to lapse. Respondent 
Irey consciously and willfully disregarded the licensing 
statute and practiced his alleged trade as an engineer 
without an education, a college degree or a license, 
contrary to civil and criminal law. Licensing did 
not merely require payment of a fee, but required 
testing and examination. It did require a demonstration 
of competence. Respondent Irey has no college degree, 
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has no formal education and no license to practice 
his claimed profession of engineering. (Depo p. 3)(R. 
130 and 131). 
In the Lignell case, the owners knew the 
contractor in his professional capacity and had done 
work with the contractor previously. Moreover, in 
Lignell, the owners became their own general contractor, 
a stature they had taken before with the unlicensed 
contractor. 
In the case before the court, the Appellant 
had not had previous professional or trade experience 
with the Respondent Corporation nor Irey. The Appellant 
was not aware that the Respondent, Richard F. Irey, 
doing business as Industrial Engineering and 
Manufacturing Corporation, had no formal education 
in engineering, had no college degree and had no license 
to practice engineering in the state of Utah or any 
other state. (R. 131). Appellant did not know the 
Respondents professionally or any other way. 
3. In the Lignell case, the contractor 
supplied a materialmen's and labor bond. The court 
said they were better off with a bond than by merely 
complying with the license statute. In the case before 
the court, no bond was posted. Fi^rther, Respondent 
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Irey held himself and his corporation out to be an 
engineering company, submitted bids for the job, met 
with the Appellant and did those things characteristic 
of a licensed engineer. 
The facts of this case clearly fall under 
the general rule previously followed by the Utah Supreme 
Court that bars recovery through Utah Courts for the 
unauthorized practice of a profession by a party that 
has not complied with licensing statutes. The facts 
of this case do not come under the court's exceptions 
as outlined in the Fillmore Products or the Liqnell 
cases. 
It was an error in law for the District 
Court to disallow a breach of warranty jury instruction 
when one of the Appellant's claims was for breach 
of warranty. The Appellant was prejudiced by not 
being allowed to submit the jury instruction. 
The only employee of Respondent Corporation 
was the Respondent Irey who was the supervisor 
responsible for the project and was not a licensed 
engineer. Mr. Lindsey was not a supervisor nor 
responsible for the project. He merely reviewed some 
aspects of previous work completed by the Respondent 
Corporation's only employee, Mr. Irey. 
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That based upon the above statutory lawf 
case law and public policy, the Appellant respectfully 
requests this court to reverse the District Court's 
rulings allowing the Respondents to avail themselves 
of the benefits of the court system through their 
Counterclaim inasmuch as the Respondents seek recovery 
for amounts claimed from the unauthorized practice 
of engineering without being licensed and without 
alleging and proving that Respondents complied with 
Utah's licensing statute. That Judgment be reversed 
for the District Court's failure to submit to the 
jury an instruction on breach of warranty. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TITLE 58, CHAPTER 22 OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, BARS THE RESPONDENT 
CORPORATION FROM SEEKING ANY RELIEF 
THROUGH THE COURTS AS THE RESPONDENT 
CORPORATION HAS NO CAPACITY TO 
SUE IN THE COURTS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH AND IS THUS PRECLUDED 
FROM OBTAINING DAMAGES. 
A. THE RESPONDENT CORPORATION 
THROUGH THE RESPONDENT IREY 
PRACTICED ENGINEERING IN THE STATE 
OF UTAH WITHOUT AN ENGINEERING 
LICENSE IN VIOLATION OF CHAPTER 
22 OF TITLE 58 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
The Respondent Corporation seeks to recover 
for services and materials rendered by the Respondent 
Irey as a professional engineer, doing business asr 
Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing Corporation. 
In order for the Respondents to state a claim, they 
must allege and prove that at the time the work was 
performed and the materials furnished, there was a 
licensed engineer under the laws of the state of Utah 
that was doing the work and responsible for the project. 
Mr. Irey, through the Respondent Corporation, 
represented that he could practice engineering by 
producing, for the Appellant, an automatic terminal 
bolt-to-coil assembly machine under specific 
specifications. (Depo. p. 27-28)(R. 130 and 131). 
The Respondent Irey knew he would not be able to produce 
a machine that would work as he thought it could. 
- 24 -
(Depo. p. 18) (R. 130 and 131). Mr. Irey also knew 
that it would cost more to produce this machine than 
he originally told the Appellant in order to finalize 
a business deal. (Depo. p. 32)(R. 130 and 131). 
The Respondent, Richard F. Irey, doing business as 
Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing Corporationf 
had no formal education in engineering, had no college 
degree and had no license to practice engineering 
in the state of Utah or in any other state. (Depo. 
p. 3)(R. 130 and 131). Chapter 22 of Title 58 of 
the Utah Code, makes it unlawful for any person to 
practice professional engineering or to use in 
connection with his name, or otherwise assume, use 
or advertise any title or description tending to convey 
the impression that he is a professional engineer 
or land surveyor unless that person has been duly 
registered under the provisions of the statute. Mr. 
Irey, by his own testimony, establishes that he was 
not duly registered under the provisions of that chapter 
and title. (Depo. p. 3)(R. 130 and 131). 
While the strength of statutes such as these, 
set out above, has been somewhat eroded in recent 
years, it is the Appellant's position that Chapter 
22 of Title 58 of the Utah Code, was intended to apply 
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directly to this situation. 
Though Mr. Irey disclaims the term 
"professional engineer"f that term is defined by statute 
as "a person who, by reason of his special knowledge 
of the mathematical and physical science and the 
principles and methods of engineering analysis and 
design, acquired by professional education and practical 
experience, is qualified to practice engineering as 
hereinafter defined, as attested by his legal 
registration as a professional engineer." (See Section 
58-22-2, Utah Code Annotated herein). Consequently, 
Mr. Irey engaged in the "practice of engineering" 
even though he now claims not to be a "professional 
engineer", and his actions are in violation of the 
law. Section 58-22-2, goes on to define the terms 
"practice of engineering". In relevant part it states 
as follows: 
The term "practice of engineering" within 
the meaning and intent of this act shall mean the 
performance of any professional service or creative 
work requiring engineering education, training and 
experience, and the application of special knowledge 
of the mathematical, physical, and engineering services 
to such professional services or creative work as 
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consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning, 
design and supervision of construction for the purposes 
of assuring compliance with specifications and design 
in connection with the utilization of the forces, 
energies, and materials of nature in the development, 
production, and functioning of engineering processes, 
apparatuses, machines, equipment... 
The section further states: 
A person shall be construed to 
practice or offer to practice 
engineering, within the meaning 
and intent of this act, who 
practices any branch of the 
profession of engineering; or 
who, by verbal claim, sign, 
advertisement, letterhead, card 
or in any other way, represents 
himself to be a professional 
engineer, or through the use of 
some other title implies that 
he is a professional engineer; 
or who holds himself as able to 
perform or 
engineering 
other E 
who does 
service 
rofessional 
Per 
or 
form 
work 
anv 
or 
services 
designated by the practitioner 
or recognized by educational 
practitioner or recognized by 
education authorities as 
engineering. 
Mr. Irey and his corporation have violated 
this statute and their actions can be censured and 
constrained in accordance with the provisions of this 
statute. The Utah Supreme Court defined the practice 
of professional engineering in the case of Smith v. 
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American Packing and Provision Co., 102 Utah 351, 
130 P.2d 951 (1942), as the assembling of machinery 
and equipment and its proper coordination in the 
operation of a packing plant, involving problems of 
public health, sanitation, and efficient and economical 
operation, are in the field of "engineering11 within 
meaning of statutory definition thereof contained 
in the statute providing for regulation and licensing 
of professional engineers. Consequently, the Respondent 
Irey through his Respondent Corporation did practice 
professional engineering as he held himself out as 
an engineer and did perform engineering tasks in 
violation of Utah statute prohibiting the same. 
Testimony at trial by Joseph W. Lindsey, 
as recorded in reporter's transcript of Mr. Lindsey, 
does not show direct employment, supervision or work 
on the project in a manner to comply with the statute 
that supervision, responsibility and work on the project 
be done by employees that were licensed to practice 
engineering in the state of Utah. 
Mr. Lindsey is self-employed as an independent 
consulting engineer and received his education from 
the University of Utah. (T. 2, 3 and 7). Mr. Lindsey 
was not an employee, officer or director of the 
- 28 -
Respondent Corporation and never met with anyone from 
the Appellant's Company. (T. 25 and 26). Mr. Lindsey 
never made any drawings or designs for the machine. 
(T. 29). Mr. Lindsey never conducted any tests with 
the machine. (T. 29). Mr. Lindsey did not consider 
himself responsible for whether or not the machine 
worked and made no certifications to the machine by 
any drawings, etc. (T. 24). Mr. Lindsey was there 
to consult, merely because he was in the same building 
with the Respondent Irey. He only reviewed some items 
that the Respondent Irey had previously designed. 
(T. 24). He was in no manner connected with the 
Appellant nor was he the designer of the machine. 
(T. 25 and 26). He was not hired by the Appellant 
to manufacture the machine. Mr. Lindsey did receive 
some compensation on a labor trading basis for his 
perusal of some designs completed by the Respondent 
Irey. However, he was not responsible for the 
manufacturing of the machine. 
The Respondents1 informal and sporadic 
consultations with Mr. Lindsey in reviewing some aspects 
of previous designs completed by the Respondent Irey 
would not comply with Utah statute nor evade the 
requirement that the Respondent (Corporation have 
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responsibility, supervision and work performed by 
a licensed engineer. The general rule of law is found 
in Bronold v. Enqler, 194 N.Y. 323, 87 N.E. 427 
(1909), involving a statute requiring the licensing 
of plumbers, where the court held that a statutory 
requirement of a license as a prerequisite to recovery 
on a contract, cannot be evaded by a firm that has 
no licensed member through the procedure of employing 
a licensed person to manage the business and enforce 
its contracts. (51 Am. Jur. 2d Licenses and Permits, 
Section 68) (1970) . 
The Respondent Irey clearly held himself 
out through letters, contracts, actions and memorandum 
as a licensed engineering company, and practiced 
engineering without a license on behalf of the 
Appellant. The requirement that supervision, 
responsibility and work on the project be performed 
by a licensed engineer should not be evaded by the 
fact that Mr. Lindsey merely informally reviewed some 
plans previously designed by the Respondent Irey. 
B. THE RESPONDENT CORPORATION 
IS BARRED FROM USING THE COURT 
SYSTEM IN THE STATE OF UTAH FOR 
RECOVERY OF ANY SUMS DUE IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE UNAUTHORIZED 
PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 58-22-20. 
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Section 58-22-20 provides in relevant part 
as follows: 
Any person who shall practice, 
or offer to practice 
engineering..•in this state without 
being registered in accordance 
with the provisions of this act, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Any person who shall practice, 
or offer to practice 
engineering...in this state without 
being registered in accordance 
with the provisions of this act, 
may be enjoined by the District 
Court from practicing 
engineering...until such person 
shall have been lawfully registered 
under this act. i 
It shall be the duty of all duly 
constituted officers of the law 
of this state, or any political 
subdivision thereof, to enforce 
the provisions of this act, and 
to prosecute and enjoin any persons 
violating same... 
No person shall bring or maintain 
any action in the courts of this 
state for enforcement of any 
contract or the recovery of any 
sums due in connection with the 
practice of engineering...without 
alleging and proving that he was 
duly authorized to practice under 
the provisions of this act, and 
no firm, co-partnership, corporation 
or joint stock association shall 
bring or maintain any action in 
the courts of this state for 
enforcement of any contract or 
the recovery of any sums due in 
connection with the practice of 
engineering. . .without alleging 
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and proving that such practice 
was carried on by professional 
engineers. ..authorized to practice 
under the provisions of this act. 
Chapter 22 of Title 58 of the Utah Code, 
is not unlike other licensing statutes that prohibit 
a person from practicing professional services in 
order to protect the public. The purpose of statutes 
requiring the licensing of engineers, surveyors, 
contractors, drillers, etc., was defined by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Cannon v. Gardner, 611 
P. 2d 1207 (Utah 1980). The Supreme Court stated 
that the general purposes of statutes dealing with 
the registration of various professional or specialized 
services is to provide for qualification, registration 
and licensing of persons who hold themselves out to 
the public as having qualifications in specialized 
areas which affect public health, safety or welfare 
and thus to guard against unqualified persons deluding 
others into believing that they are competent to render 
specialized services. 
The Supreme Court stated in Smith v. American 
Packing and Provision, Co., 102, Utah 351, 130 P.2d 
951 (1942) that a person seeking recovery for personal 
services for which a license is required as a condition 
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precedent to the rendition thereof for a fee, must 
allege and prove facts which show he was licensed 
at the time in which such services were performed 
or that he was exempt from the class required to have 
such license. The Utah Supreme Court, in August of 
1983, reaffirmed its position concerning the requirement 
of professionals to meet statutes requiring licensing. 
In the case of George v. Oren Limited and Associates, 
672 P.2d 732 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court stated 
its general policy and rule that licensing statutes 
are clearly enacted for the purpose of protecting 
the public against inept and financially irresponsible 
builders. This case dealt with the requirement that 
contractors receive a license at the time of building. 
The Court went on to explain as follows: 
If the purpose of licensing is 
to protect the public, then the 
general rule in this state is 
that the party who does not obtain 
a license, but is required to 
do so, cannot obtain relief to 
enforce the terms of his contract, 
including payment thereunder, 
even though there are other 
penalties imposed against him 
expressly by statute, including 
criminal sanctions...and there 
is no doubt that the purpose of 
the licensing statute relating 
to contactors is protection of 
the public. 
The licensing of engineers would also be 
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expressly for the protection of the public. This 
general rule and policy in the state of Utah is further 
asserted in the following cases: 
Fillmore Products, Inc., v. Western States 
Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977), Meridian 
Corp. v. McGlynn and Garmaker, Co., 567 P.2d 1110 
(Utah 1977), Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 
733 (1948) and Heber Valley Truck, Inc., v. Utah Coal 
and Energy, Inc., 611 P.2d 389 (Utah 1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court has been specific 
in its sanctions and remedies against those who practice 
without obtaining the statutory license requirements. 
In the case of Mosley v. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 
453 P. 2d 149 (1969), the Supreme Court stated that 
the statute requiring welldrillers to secure and keep 
annual permits was designed for the protection of 
the people of the state of Utah and that a party who 
drills a well without first securing such license 
or permit cannot recover, for work done, either in 
contract or on the theory of quantum meruit. 
The Supreme Court has been clear in its 
explanation of the purpose of statutes requiring the 
licensing of professionals. This policy is to protect 
the public and the sanction for violation of this 
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policy is to deny any unlicensed professional to avail 
himself of the protections and benefits of the court 
system in the state of Utah. 
The above cited statutes and cases have 
been almost uniformly interpreted by the courts of 
this state and other states in such a way as to preclude 
enforcement of payment under a contract, when a statute 
required a party to be licensedf such as an engineer, 
architect, welldriller, plumber, contractor, etc., 
when the party was unlicensed. 
In a series of cases in the state of Utah, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that an unlicensed 
party, including those working as a corporation, have 
no standing in the courts, such as in Meridian 
Corporation v. McGlynn Garmaker, Co., 567 P.2d 1110 
(Utah 1977). Citing Smith v. American Packing and 
Provision, Co. , 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942), 
and Olsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948), 
Chief Justice Ellett, speaking for the court stated: 
This Court has held that the 
contracts of unlicensed contractors 
are void. In the case of Olsen 
v. Reese we held: 
The authorities are fairly uniform 
to the effect that failure to 
obtain a license, which is required 
by a statute enacted solely for 
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revenue purposes, does render 
contracts made by the offending 
party void. ' On the other hand, 
contracts made by an unlicensed 
— 
contractor when in violation of 
a statute passed for the protection 
of the public are held to be void 
and unenforceable. Our statute 
is so worded as to indicate a 
legislative intent to protect 
the citizens from irresponsible 
contractors. The statute, while 
not comprehensive, provides for 
a small license fee. Control 
over the contractor is given to 
the Department of Registration. 
Upon an appropriate hearing, the 
department may, for unprofessional 
conduct, suspend or cancel the 
license. Good reputation and 
integrity are essential to obtaining 
a license and the entire object 
of the statute is protection of 
the public against fraudulent 
and illegal practice, which have 
always been recognized as a distinct 
characteristic of statutes, which 
are not mere revenue measures. 
The statute being enacted for 
the protection of the public, 
Plaintiff's written contract is 
void. 
The case of Smith v. American 
Packing and Provision, Co., held 
that it was necessary for a 
Plaintiff, where a license is 
required, to allege that he had 
the license in order to state 
a cause of action. A license 
in another state cannot be 
substituted for a license in Utah. 
The Plaintiff, in this case, is 
aware of our clear prior holdings? 
however, he urges us to overrule 
the case- of Olsen v. Reese (supra, 
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footnote 3). This we refuse to 
do. We think the case was properly 
decided, and we confirm the 
principles of law therein stated 
to be the law of this state. 
In the case of Mosely v. Johnson, 22 Utah 
2d 348, 453 P.2d 149 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
decided a case very similar to the one before this 
court at this time. 
In Moselv, the court concluded that a contract 
entered into by an unlicensed welldriller was void 
and unenforceable. 
Regarding the Plaintiff's quantum meruit 
claim and lien claim, the court in Mosely concluded 
by stating: 
"A court will no more assist one 
who fails to secure a required 
license to recover money by means 
of lien foreclosure than it will 
in an action on the contract or 
on a theory of quantum meruit." 
The foregoing interpretation of contractor 
collection efforts, while in violation of state 
licensing laws, is consistent with the law of most 
states. 51 Am. Jur. 2d Licenses and Permits, Section 
64 (1970), states: 
Under a statute providing that 
a contractor cannot maintain an 
action unless he alleges and proves 
that he was duly licensed at all 
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times during the performance of 
the contract or when his cause 
of action arose, it is commonly 
held that he cannot recover if 
he was not duly licensed at the 
time specified in the statute 
or if his license had expired 
or been revoked during the 
performance of the contract, 
regardless of whether he became 
duly licensed thereafter, and 
regardless of the period that 
elapsed between the time when 
he was not licensed and the time 
when he became licensed. 
See also 82 A.L.R. 2d 1429y 1443 (1962). 
On some occasions and for specific purposes, the rule 
laid down by the foregoing cases has been modified 
as in Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western Paving, Inc., 
561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977) which deals with a 
corporation. In this case, while supporting the general 
rule, the court set forth some exceptions. In holding 
for the unlicensed contractor. Justice Wilkins, speaking 
for the court said: 
We distinguish this case from 
those cited in note 2. In this 
case it is clear that an unlicensed 
subcontractor is dealing with 
a licensed general or original 
contractor. And the Defendants 
have not disputed that the entire 
sewer project was under the 
supervision of a licensed project 
engineer, that all of the work 
had to meet the specifications 
and requirements of the general 
contract and that all of the work 
had to be approved and accepted 
by the project engineer before 
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any payment was made by the town 
of Ferron. 
The current case is distinguished from the 
Fillmore Products case which also deals with a 
corporation, in that (1) the Respondents were not 
acting as a subcontractor to a party licensed as an 
engineer but Respondents were the contracting parties 
with the Appellant and were the only contracting parties 
responsible for the manufacturing of the machine and 
(2) the project was not under the supervision, direction 
or control of a licensed project engineer. Mr. Lindsey 
had no control, direction or supervision over the 
Respondents or responsibility for the project. (T. 
24, 25). 
The court also deviated from the general 
rule in Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). 
Again, while sustaining the general rule, the court 
set forth exceptions to the rule: 
This court has had frequent occasion 
to comment on the status of 
unlicensed contractors, and has 
persistently construed the cited 
statute as having been designed 
to protect the public and 
consequently to bar recovery by 
unlicensed contractors for services 
rendered under their contracts. 
The most recent Utah cases so 
holding are Mosely v. Johnson, 
22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149, 
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(1969) and Meridian Corp. v. 
McGlynn and Garmaker Co., Utah, 
567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). The 
rationale of those cases is, 
however, that the party from whom 
the contractor seeks to recover 
is in the class the legislature 
intended to protect. A litigant 
is not a member of that class 
if the required protection (i.e., 
against inept and financially 
irresponsible builders) is in 
fact afforded by another means... 
In this case, the denial of recovery 
to BBC would indeed impose 
unreasonable penalties and 
forfeitures, particularly because 
the owners were never deprived 
of the kind of protection the 
licensing statute was designed 
to afford. We consider the 
following circumstances to be 
of controlling significance in 
this regard: 
1. BBC has not failed to satisfy 
the licensing authority of its 
technical competence and financial 
qualification for license. It 
had inadvertently permitted its 
license to lapse. Restoration 
of licensed status involved no 
new demonstration of qualification, 
but only payment of fee. 
2. The owners did not rely on 
any BBC competence they inferred 
from BBC's having advertised itself 
as a general contractor. They 
had previously employed BBC as 
a builder in apartment house 
construction. Moreover, the owners 
usurped the general contractor's 
prerogatives in constructing the 
Terrace Incline complex. They 
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relied on their own competence. 
3. BBC supplied a performance 
bond as well as a labor and material 
suppliers payment bond. The owners 
were infinitely better assured 
of adequate and complete performance 
without financial exposure beyond 
the contract price than they would 
have been by BBC's mere compliance 
with the licensing statute. 
The Lignell case is likewise distinguishable 
from the case before the court in the following: 
1. Respondent Irey did not "just 
inadvertently" allow his license to lapse. Respondent 
Irey consciously and willfully disregarded the licensing 
statute and practiced his alleged trade as an engineer 
without an education, a college degree or a license, 
contrary to civil and criminal law. Licensing did 
not merely require payment of a fee, but required 
testing and examination. It did require a demonstration 
of competence. Respondent Irey has no college degree, 
has no formal education and no license to practice 
his claimed profession of engineering. (Depo. p.3)(R. 
130 and 131). 
2. In the Lignell case, the owners knew 
the contractor in his professional capacity and had 
done work with the contractor previously. Moreover, 
in Lignell the owners became their own general 
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contractor, a stature they had taken before with the 
unlicensed contractor. 
In the case before the court, the Appellant 
had not had previous professional or trade experience 
with the Respondent Corporation nor Irey. The Appellant 
was not aware that the Respondent, Richard F. Ireyf 
doing business as Industrial Engineering and 
Manufacturing Corporation, had no formal education 
in engineering, had no college degree and had no license 
to practice engineering in the state of Utah or any 
other state. (R. 131). Appellant did not know the 
Respondents professionally or in any other way. 
3. In the Lignell case, the contractor 
supplied a materialmen's and labor bond. The court 
said they were better off with a bond than by merely 
complying with the license statute. In the case before 
the court, no bond was posted. Further, Respondent 
Irey held himself and his corporation out to be an 
engineering company, submitted bids for the job, met 
with the Appellant and did those things characteristic 
of a licensed engineer. 
The facts of this case clearly fall under 
the general rule previously followed by the Utah Supreme 
Court that bars recovery through Utah Courts for the 
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unauthorized practice of a profession by a party that 
has not complied with licensing statutes. The facts 
of this case do not come under the court's exceptions 
as outlined in the Fillmore Products or the Lignell 
cases. 
C. THE RESPONDENT CORPORATION 
DID NOT ALLEGE IN ITS COUNTERCLAIM 
THAT THE PRACTICE OF ENGINEERING 
WAS CARRIED ON BY PROFESSIONAL 
ENGINEERS AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, SECTION 58-22-20. 
Section 58-22-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, provides in relevent part as follows: 
No person shall bring or maintain 
any action in the courts of this 
state for enforcement of any 
contract or the recovery of any 
sums due in connection with the 
practice of engineering...without 
alleging and proving that he was 
duly authorized to practice under 
the provisions of this act, and 
no firm co-partnership, corporation 
or joint stock association shall 
bring or maintain any action in 
the courts of this state for 
enforcement of any contract or 
the recovery of any sums due in 
connection with the practice of 
engineering. . .without alleging 
and proving that such practice 
was carried on by professional 
engineers...authorized to practice 
under the provisions of this act. 
The statute makes it mandatory for a party 
or a corporation to allege and prove that work was 
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carried on by professional engineers authorized to 
practice engineering under the provisions of the Act. 
Respondent's Counterclaim does not allege 
that supervision responsibility or work on the project 
was done by engineers authorized to practice engineering 
under the provisions of the Act. (R. 108 through 118). 
Consequently, the Respondent Corporation and Irey 
would be barred from maintaining any action in the 
courts of this state for enforcement of any contract 
or for the recovery of any sums due in connection 
with the practice of engineering. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld this requirement 
as stated in the case of Smith v. American Packing 
and Provision, Co.y 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942) 
as follows: 
A person seeking recovery for 
personal services for which a 
license is required as a "condition 
precedent" to the rendition thereof 
for a fee, must allege and prove 
facts which show he was licensed 
at the time such services were 
performed or that he was exempt 
from the class required to have 
such a license. 
The above statute and case law make it clear 
that the burden is on the Respondents to allege and 
prove compliance with the licensing statute or that 
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they are exempt from the license requirement. In 
this case, the Respondents have not met the requirements 
of the statute. Consequently, the Respondents should 
not be allowed to maintain any action in Utah courts. 
POINT II 
IT WAS AN ERROR IN LAW FOR THE 
DISTRICT COURT TO DISALLOW A BREACH 
OF WARRANTY JURY INSTRUCTION WHEN 
ONE OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS IS FOR 
BREACH OF WARRANTY 
The Appellant alleged in its Amended 
Complaint, a cause of action against the Respondents 
for breach of warranty. (R. 124). The District Court 
failed to allow a jury instruction on breach of warranty 
to be submitted to the jury. Appellant took exception 
to the court's refusal to submit the instruction to 
the jury. (Reporter's Transcript p. 20)(R. 214 through 
239) . 
The Appellant was prejudiced by not being 
allowed to submit to the jury an instruction on breach 
of warranty after alleging it in its Complaint and 
offering evidence at trial on breach of implied 
warranty. 
POINT III 
UTAH COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY 
HELD THAT COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS IS REQUIRED BEFORE 
A PARTY IS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS 
CREATED BY STATUTE 
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The general rule that compliance with statute 
is required before a party is entitled to benefits 
created by statute is demonstrated in First Security 
Mortgage Co. , v. Hansen , 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981). 
The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the argument of 
substantial compliance as unavailing in this case 
and held that a Notice of Mechanic's Lien was invalid 
due to lack of verification as required by statute 
where instead of a sworn statement that contents of 
the lien notice were true, a statutory corporate 
acknowledgement was used wherein Claimant swore he 
was the attorney and signed on behalf of the 
corporation. The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this 
rule in the cases of Graff v. Boise Cascade Corporation 
660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983) and AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree 
Development Co.r 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986). This rule 
is also followed in other jurisdictions. Lewis v. 
Wanamaker, 692 P.2d 397 (Kan. App. 1984) and Schofield 
v. Copeland, 692 P.2d 519 (Nev 1985). 
The Respondents in this case did not comply 
with statute that required the Respondent Corporation 
to allege in its Counterclaim that the practice of 
engineering was carried on by professional engineers 
authorized to practice under the provisions of U.C.A. 
58-22-20 and did not comply with statute that required 
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the Respondent Irey to be a licensed engineer. 
Consequently, the Respondents should not be allowed 
the benefits of the statute to use the court system 
in Utah for the recovery of any sums due in connection 
with the unauthorized practice of professional 
engineering. 
CONCLUSION 
The only employee of Respondent Corporation 
was the Respondent Irey who was the supervisor 
responsible for the project and who was not a licensed 
engineer. Mr. Lindsey was not a supervisor, employee 
or responsible for the project. He merely reviewed 
some aspects of previous work completed by the 
Respondent Corporation's only employee Mr. Irey. 
Clearly, it is unfair and unjust to allow a corporation 
to recover on engineering services when those services 
have not been done by a licensed engineer as required 
by law for the protection of the public against fraud, 
incompetence and irresponsibility. If the law is 
not enforced, then what is there to prevent Mr. Irey, 
who is not a licensed engineer, from contracting with 
other parties to perform engineering services under 
the name of the Respondent Corporation, then doing 
the work himself and allowing a friend, in the same 
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building, review some aspects of the work Mr. Irey 
has done, and then allow the corporation to claim 
a fee for engineering services. This is the same 
as allowing an unlicensed party to set up a corporation 
with himself as the only employee to do legal work, 
have an attorney friend review aspects of his work, 
and then allow the corporation to collect legal fees 
without a license to practice law. This is not in 
compliance with the law and is clearly unjust and 
unfair. 
The above analysis is clear in its review 
of statute, case law and evidence to support the 
conclusion that the Respondent Irey was not educated, 
trained nor licensed in the state of Utah to practice 
professional engineering and that as a consequence 
of Irey's practice of engineering, as the only employee 
of the Respondent Corporation, is that the Respondent 
Corporation is denied by statute, case law, reason, 
policy and the spirit of the law, to avail itself 
of the benefits of the court system in the state of 
Utah. 
That it was a prejudicial error of law not 
to submit to the jury an instruction on breach of 
warranty after the Appellant had alleged the breach 
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of warranty in its Complaint and offered evidence 
at trial to prove the same. 
That based upon the aboVe statutory lawr 
case law and public policy, the Appellant respectfully 
requests this court to reverse the District Court's 
rulings allowing the Respondents to avail themselves 
of the benefits of the court system through their 
Counterclaim inasmuch as the Respondents seek recovery 
for amounts claimed from the unauthorized practice 
of engineering without being licensed and without 
alleging and proving that Respondents complied with 
Utah's licensing statute. That Judgment be reversed 
for District Court's failure to submit to the jury 
an instruction on breach of warranty. 
Appellant prays for relief as set forth 
above. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this IS day of 
August, 1988. 
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
RON R. KUNZLER 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff, Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A U.C.A. 58-22-2, 20 
(195 3, as amended) 
APPENDIX B Reporter's Transcript 
of Joseph W. Lindsey 
p. 2, 3, 7, 24, 25, 26 and 
29 
APPENDIX C Reporter's Transcript, 
p. 3 through 7, 16 through 
20 
APPENDIX D Plaintiff, Appellant 
Exhibit 40P 
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APPENDIX A U.C.A. 58-22-2, 20 
(1953, as amended) 
58-22-1 REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT 
CHAPTER 22 
ENGINEERS AND LAND SURVEYORS 
Section 58-22-1. Purpose of act—Unlawful practices. 
58-22-2. Definitions. 
58-22-3. Administration of act—Committee—Members—Appointment—Term— 
Oath. 
58-22-4. Members of committee—Qualifications. 
58-22-5. Per diem and expenses. 
58-22-6. Removal of member—Grounds—Vacancies—Method of filling. 
58-22-7. Meetings—Officers—Quorum. 
58-22-8. Powers. 
58-22-9. Director to receive and account for money—Disposition—Expendi-
tures—Budget. 
58-22-10. Records—Register of applications for registration—Biennial report. 
58-22-11. Roster of registered professional engineers and registered land sur-
veyors. 
58-22-12. Applicants—Requirements. 
58-22-13. Issuance of certificate to persons currently qualified. 
58-22-14. Applications—Fees. 
58-22-15. Examinations—Scope. 
58-22-16. Certificate of registration—Contents. 
58-22-17. Expiration of certificates—Renewal—Fee. 
58-22-18. Duties of public bodies engaging in construction of public works. 
58-22-19. Revocation of certificates—Grounds—Charges of fraud, deceit, gross 
negligence, incompetency, or misconduct—Hearing—Reissuing— 
Appeals. 
58-22-20. OffenseB—Misdemeanor—Injunctions—Enforcement of act—Author-
ity to practice under act prerequisite for bringing or maintaining 
action for services. 
58-22-21. Exemption. 
58-22-22. Existing certificates—Persons presently practicing engineering. 
58-22-1. Purpose of act—Unlawful practices.—In order to safeguard 
life, health, and property, and to promote the public welfare, any person 
in either public or private capacity practicing or offering to practice en-
gineering or land surveying, shall hereafter be required to submit evidence 
that he is qualified so to practice and shall be registered as hereinafter 
provided; and it shall be unlawful for any person to practice or to offer to 
practice in this state, engineering or land surveying, as defined in the pro-
visions of this act, or to use in connection with his name or otherwise as-
sume, use or advertise any title or description tending to convey the im-
pression that he is a professional engineer or land surveyor, unless such 
person has been duly registered under the provisions of this act. 
History: I*. 1955, ch. 118, § 1. providing for a committee of engineering 
examiners for professional engineers and 
Title of Act. land surveyors and the appointment of its 
An act to regulate the practices of en- members; fixing the terms of the members 
gineering and land surveying; providing of said committee and defining its powers 
for the registration of qualified persons as and duties; setting forth the minimum 
professional engineers and land surveyors, qualifications and other requirements for 
and providing for the certification of en- registration; establishing fees with expira-
gineers-in-traming; defining the terms tion and renewal requirements; imposing 
"engineer," "professional engineer," "en- certain duties upon the state and political 
gineer-in-training," "practice of engineer- subdivisions thereof in connection with 
ing," "land surveyor," and "practice of public work and providing for the enforce-
land surveying," "exempting persons, firms, ment of this act and penalties for its viola-
copartnerships, corporations and joint stock tion; and repealing chapter 10, Title 58, 
associations under certain conditions"; Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
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Cross-Reference. 
Licensing of s tat ionary engineers. 17-3-
37. 
Construction and application. 
The validi ty and application of sections 
of this act are discussed in Skelton v. 
Lees, 8 U. (2d) 88, 329 P . 2d 389. 
Out-of-state licensee. 
Licensed Wyoming engineer and land 
surveyor may testify concerning survey 
he conducted in connection with a bound-
ary dispute in Utah though he was not 
licensed as a survevor in Utah. Cornia v. 
Putnam, 26 U. (2d)' 354, 489 P . 2d 1001. 
Collateral References. 
Licenses<$=>llfl). 
53 C.J.S. Licenses § 30. 
Surveyors and civil engineers, 50 Am. 
Jur . 1149, Surveyors and Civil Engineers 
§ 1 et seq. 
Architect 's or engineer 's compensation 
as affected by inabil i ty to carry out plan 
or specifications at amount satisfactory to 
employer, 127 A. L. R. 410. 
Constitutionality of s ta tu te regulating 
land surveyors or civO engineers, 55 A. L. 
R. 307. 
What amounts to engineering or archi-
tectural services within license require-
ments, 82 A. L. R. 2d 1013. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Engineering and architecture. 
The professions of practicing architec-
ture and professional engineering are re-
lated in some particulars, and have at 
least some activities in common and to 
that degree overlap; but this does not re-
quire one engaged in either to procure a 
license in the other simply because some 
of the activities in one overlap the other. 
Smith v. American Packing & Provision 
Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P. 2d 951. 
Licensed engineer was not required to 
obtain architect 's license merely because 
his professional services happened to over-
lap with some a r c h i t e c t u r a l functions. 
Smith v. American Packing & Provision 
Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P. 2d 951. 
Field of professional engineering did not 
embrace entire iield of architecture merely 
because of some overlapping of their re-
spective functions. Smith v. American 
Packing & Provision Co., 102 U. 351, 130 
P. 2d 951. 
Real criterion for deciding whether a 
licensed engineer had to have an archi-
tect 's license was whether his services 
were necessarily embraced by his engineer-
ing license, not whether such services 
<'ould be lawfully performed by an archi-
tect. Smith v. American Packing & Pro-
vision Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P. 2d 951. 
(Question of whether an engineer's activ-
ities were far enough away from engineer-
ing and close enough to architecture to 
require architect 's license would be de-
cided on case by case basis. Smith v. 
American Packing & Provision Co., 102 
U. 351, 130 P . 2d 951. 
The assembling of machinery and equip-
ment, and its proper co-ordination in the 
operation of a packing plant, appeared to 
be in the Held of engineering. Smith v. 
American Packing & Provision Co., 102 U. 
351. 130 P. 2d 951. 
Rehabilitation and remodeling of killing 
floor and meat department of packing 
plant was engineering, not architecture. 
Smith v. American Packing & Provision 
Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P . 2d 951. 
58-22-2. Definitions.—Certain words and phrases used in this act, 
unless contrary to or inconsistent with the context, are defined as follows: 
"Director' shall mean the director of registration of the state of Utah. 
"Department" shall mean the department of registration of the state of 
Utah. 
The term ''engineer'' as used in this act shall mean a "professional 
engineer7 as hereinafter defined. I 
The term "responsible charge'' of work means the control and direction 
by the use of initiative, skill, and independent judgment, of the investiga-
tion or design of professional engineering work or the supervision of such 
projects. 
The term "professional engineer' within the meaning and intelit of this 
act shall mean a person who, by reason of his special knowledge of the 
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mathematical and physical science and the principles and methods of en-
gineering analysis and design, acquired by professional education and prac-
tical experience, is qualified to practice engineering as hereinafter defined, 
as attested by his legal registration as a professional engineer. 
The term "engineer-in-training" as used in this act shall mean a 
candidate for registration as a professional engineer who is a graduate in 
an approved engineering curriculum of four years or more from a school or 
college approved by the committee as of satisfactory standing, or who has 
had four years or more of experience in engineering work of a charac-
ter satisfactory to the committee; and who, in addition, has successfully 
passed the examination in the fundamental engineering subjects prior to 
completion of the requisite years of experience in enerineerincr work, as pro-
vided in section 58-22-15, and who shall have received from the committee, 
as hereinafter defined, a certificate stating that he has successfully passed 
this portion of the professional examinations. 
The term "practice of engineering," within the meaning and intent of 
this act, shall mean the performance of any professional service or creative 
work requiring engineering education, training and experience, and the 
application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engi-
neering sciences to such professional services or creative work as consulta-
tion, investigation, evaluation, planning, design, and supervision of con-
struction for the purpose of assuring compliance with specifications and 
design, in connection with the utilization of the forces, energies, and ma-
terials of nature in the development, production, and functioning of en-
gineering processes, apparatus, machines, equipment facilities, buildings, 
structures, works, or utilities, or any combinations or aggregations thereof 
employed in or devoted to public or private enterprise or uses. The term 
"practice of engineering*' comprehends the practice of those branches of 
engineering, the pursuit of any of which affects the safety of life, health 
or property, or the public welfare. Said practice includes the doing of such 
architectural work as is incidental to the practice of engineering. 
A person shall be construed to practice or offer to practice engineering, 
within the meaning and intent of this act, who practices any branch of the 
profession of engineering; or who, by verbal claim, sign, advertisement, 
letterhead, card, or in any other way represents himself to be a professional 
engineer, or through the use of some other title implies that he is a pro-
fessional engineer; or who holds himself out as able to perform, or who 
does perform any engineering service or work or any other professional 
service designated by the practitioner or recognized by educational au-
thorities as engineering. 
The practice of engineering shall not include the work ordinarily per-
formed by persons who operate or maintain machinery or equipment. 
The term "land surveyeor" as used in this act shall mean a person who 
engages in the practice of land surveying as hereinafter defined. 
The practice of ldnd surveying within the meaniner and intent of this 
act includes surveying of areas for their correct determination and de-
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scription and for conveyancing, or for the establishment or re-establishment 
of land boundaries and the plotting of lands and subdivisions thereof. 
The term "committee'7 as used in this act shall mean the representative 
committee of professional engineers and land surveyors provided for by 
this act. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 118, § 2. Skelton v. Lees, 8 U. (2d) 88, 329 P. 2d 
389. 
Construction and application. 
This act broadened the field of control Collateral References, 
beyond the three principal fields of me- Licenses^>ll(l). 
ehamcai, civil, and electrical engineering. 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 1. 
DECISIONS UNDER FOBMER LAW 
Architects and engineers.
 l t i es overlapped those of an architect. 
Former section 58-10-2 did not require Smith v. American Packing & Provision 
an engineer to qualify under chapter 3 of Co., 102 U. 351, 130 P. 2d p51. 
this title simply because some oi his activ-
58-22-3. Administration of act—Committee—Members—Appointment— 
Term—Oath.—The administration of this act is hereby devolved upon the 
department of registration. The committee shall consist of seven profes-
sional engineers, one of whom shall be a land surveyor, who shall be ap-
pointed by the director from among the nominees recommended by the 
representative engineering societies in the state and shall have the qualifica-
tions required by section 58-22-4. The members of the committee of engi-
neering examiners, as it is constituted at the time of passage of this act, are 
continued in oiEce until the expiration of their terms, at which time the 
director shall make an appointment as hereinbefore provided for a period 
of three years. Said members shall serve from the date of their appointment 
until the expiration of their terms or until their successors are duly ap-
pointed and qualified. Every member of the committee shall receive a cer-
tificate of his appointment from the director and before beginning his term 
of office shall file with the secretary of state his written oath or affirmation 
for the faithful discharge of his official duty. On the expiration of the term 
of any member, the director shall, in the manner hereinbefore provided, ap-
point for a term of three years a registered professional engineer, having 
the qualifications required by section 58-22-4, to take the place of the mem-
ber on said committee whose term is about to expire. Each member shall 
hold office until the expiration of the term for which such member is ap-
pointed and until a successor shall have been duly appointed and qualified. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 118, §3. of engineers. Skeiton v. Lees, 8 U. (2d) 
33, 329 P. 2d 389. 
Effect of repeal. 
The repeal of former chapter 10 and the CoUateral References. 
enactment or thi9 chapter effected a Licenses<§=>21. 
* hange ot the whole administrative setup 33 C.J.S. Licenses § 37. 
and also the qualifications tor registration 
58-22-4. Members of committee—Qualifications.—Each member of the 
committee shall be a citizen of the United States and a resident of this 
state, and shall have been engaged in the practice of engineering for at least 
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court. After receipt of said notice the director shall promptly file with the 
distnct court a copy of the proceedings had before the committee. The 
case shall come up for hearing before the district court upon filing and 
service of notice by either party. 
History: L. 1965, en. 118, § 19. 
Nature of review on appeal. 
In reviewing an action taken by the 
department of registration, the district 
court 13 limited to a review of the record 
and is bound by the established rules ap-
plicable to such reviews. Skelton v. Lees, 
8 U. (2d) 88, 329 P. 2d 389. 
58-22-20. Offenses—Misdemeanor—Injunctions—Enforcement of act— 
Authonty to practice under act prerequisite for bringing or TnaiTitainiTig ac-
tion for services.—Any person who shall practice, or offer to practice, en-
gineering or land surveying in this state without being registered in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this act, or any person presenting or 
attempting to use as his own the certificate of registration or the seal of an-
other, or any person who shall give any ialse or torged evidence of any kind 
to the director or committee or to any member thereof in obtaining a cer-
tificate of registration, or any person who shall falsely impersonate any 
other registrant of like or different name, or any person who shall attempt 
to use an expired or revoked certificate of registration, or any person who 
shall violate any of the provisions of this act, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. 
Any person who shall practice, or offer to practice engineering or land 
surveying in this state without being registered in accordance with the 
provisions of this act, may be enjoined by the district court from practicing 
engineering or land surveying until such person shall have been lawfully 
registered under this act. 
It shall be the duty of all duly constituted officers of the law of this 
state, or any political subdivision thereot, to enforce the provisions of this 
act and to prosecute and enjoin any persons violating same. The attorney 
general of the state or his assistant shall act as legal adviser of the director 
and committee and render such legal assistance as may be necessary in 
carrying out the provisions of this act. 
No person shall bring or maintain any action in the courts of this state 
for enforcement of any contract or the recovery of any sums due in con-
nection with the practice of engineering or land surveying in this state as 
defined herein, without alleging and proving that he was duly authorized 
to practice under the provisions ot this act, and no firm, copartnership, 
corporation or joint stock association shall bring or maintain any action in 
the courts of this state for enforcement ot any contract or the recovery of 
any sums due in connection with the practice ot engineering or land survey-
ing, in this state as defined herein, without alleging and proving that such 
practice was earned on by protessional engineers or land surveyors re-
spectively authorized to practice under the provisions of this act. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 118, § 20. 
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Operation and effect of section. 
The effect of thiB section is to provide 
a method tor review by the courts of all 
matters arising under this chapter and it 
is improper to look to 58-1-36 for the 
method of review. Skelton v. Lees, 8 U. 
vJd) 88, 329 P. 2d 389. 
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j IN 
PACIFIC 
EMERSON 
• )-* 
Tc-E DIZTFICT COUFT 0" WCEEI 
* - * • * • • * * 
CHROMOLO) DIVISION. ; 
ELECTRIC COMPANY. ) 
PLAINTIFF. , 
RICHARD F. IREY AND INDUSTRIAL , 
ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING > 
CORPORATION. ) 
DEFENDANT. ) 
BE 
+•*•+•*•+• 
" COUNT,. STATE OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
CIVIL NO. 
TESTIMONY 
JOSEPH W. 
IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON 
35090 
OF: 
LINDSEY 
REGULARLY 
FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST. JUDGE, 
SITTING 
AND 17TI-
WITH A JURY AT OGDEN. UTAH 
I DAYS OF NOVEMBER 1987. 
ON THE 13TH. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE Y 
*•*•+••»"•-
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
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TIMOTHY W. 
13TH. 16TH. 
IAD. TO WIT: 
BLACKBURN 
E.H. FANKHAUSEP 
DEAN C. O L S E N . C. S. R. 
6 0 5 MUNICIPAL BLDG. 
OGDEN. UTAH B 4 4 0 1 
3 9 9 - B S 1 D 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
L ' t t L L T L r f-!F. f-HNKHHU'siifr : 
L R U i i P i MR. E L A C K E U R N L 
rEDIRLCT BY MR. FANKHAUSEF: 
RECRGSz BY MR. ELACKBURN: 
FURTHER REDIRECT BY MR. FANK^^JSER 
yDDLN. yidb NQv!Ct!^.iF: _i^5-_i.': ••" ii^P P.M. 
|MR. FANKHAUSER: CALL MR. LINDSEY h- THE STAND P L E A S E . 
JOSEPH W. L.INDSL * . 
CALLED H£. H WITNESS. BEING Fii:S"f DULY -WORN 
WAS EAHMiNED HNL TESTIFIED H.- fOLLUWi; 
DIRECT EXMMINMTinN 
BY MR. F H N K H H U S E R : 
U WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE L OURT AND RECORD 
PLEASE: 
H MY NAME IS JOSEPH W. LINDSEY. 
Q WHERE DO YOU RESIDE. MR. LINDSEY 
IN SANDY. UTAH. 
G AND ARE YOU EMPLOYED" 
|A SELF-EMPLOYED. 
p HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN SELF-EMPLOYLD. MR. LINDSEY'' 
SINCE 1975. 
IN WHAT CAPACITY H R E VUU SLLf—LMPLU YLD .' 
WELL. RIGHT NOW 1 Ml ^AN iNDLPEND^l CONSULTING ENGINEER. 
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L' AND WHHI HF'L. iOUh U U H L ± F- I L H 7 iONi THHT WOULL -- 1 SHOULD 
JAv. W H H T ARL vOUh H F L H S Ur L D U L H I I U N HNL» L'.PERILNLL "l HA'l 
WOULD C'UHLlF* YOU Tu tt H LuNsULfiNb ENblNLEF" 
H I H M V L A BACHELOR' £ Hf4D H MASTER' '- DLbRt-L IN MECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH. i COMPLETED ALL. OF 
1HE CLASS WORK REQUIREMENTS FOR H PH.D. IN MECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING AND H L S O IN CHEMICHL. ENGINEERING FROM THE 
U N I V E R S I T Y OF UTAH. 
\0 WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO GET YOUR DOCTORATE'' 
A JU£T THE THESIS. 
\0 OKAY. AND HAVE YOU HAD ANY PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE 
FIELD OF ENGINEERING"" 
|A YES. I'VE WORKED SINCE 1 9 S 0 IN THE FIELD OF ENGINEERING. 
Q AND WAS THIS AS A SELF-EMPLOYED CONBULTHNI OR WORKING FOR 
(OTHER CUMPANIEb"' 
H NO. I WORKED EIGHT AND A HALF YEAKb FOR HERCULES. 
INCORPORATED. 1 WORKED ABOUT FOUR YEARS FOR IMPERIAL EASTMAN, 
i WAS A FULL-TIME CONSULTANT FOR TWO YEARS FOR JOHNSON AND 
JOHNSON. I OWNED AND OPERATED MY OWN BUSINESS SINCE 1971. A 
lLOT OF THAT CONCURRENT WITH SOME OF THE OTHER WORK. 
Q IN THE COURSE OF YOUR WORK FOR OTHER COMPANIES AS WELL AS 
YOURSELF. HAVE YOU EVER MANUFACTURED OR DEVELOPED ANY-
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT OK MACHINERY"' 
b YES. QUITE A BIT. 
P AND COULD NOU GIVE Ub KIND OF A RESUME OF WHAT KIND OF 
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7 
0 DURING THPT TIME DID YOU SHARE ANY SHOP FACILITIES? 
A YES. DICK HAD AN OPERATION THAT HE DID A LOT OF 
ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY OVER THERE. AND NEEDED SOME SHEET METAL 
NORK AND OCCASIONALLY SOME MACHINE SHOP WORK. AND I MADE MY 
SHEET METAL AND MACHINE SHOP AVAILABLE TO HIM. SOMETIMES HE 
MOULD COME AND USE IT, SOMETIMES HE WOULD HAVE A MAN COME IN 
AND RUN MY MACHINES OR SOMETIMES WE WOULD DO THE WORK FOR HIM. 
|Q OKAY. NOW, ARE YOU A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH? 
(A YES, I AM. 
|Q HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN SO LICENSED? 
A I'M NOT POSITIVE 1 i'E DATE, BUT I WOULD PUT IT IN 1973, 
1974. 
|Q IS YOUR LICENSE CURRENT? 
A YES. IT IS. 
|Q WAS YOUR LICENSE IN EFFECT AND CURRENT DURING THE YEARS 
•85 THROUGH '85? 
(A YES. 
b WHEN DID YOU FIRST BECOME INVOLVED ON THE PACIFIC 
CHROMOLOX JOB, MR. LINDSEY? 
|A DICK CALLED ME ONE DAY AND SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A MEETING 
|AT CHROMOLOX, AND ASKED ME IF I WOULD COME IN AND DISCUSS WITH 
HIM SOME OF THE CONCEPTS THAT HE FELT THAT HE COULD USE IN 
[MEETING THEIR REQUIREMENTS. AND I CAME IN AND WE DID THAT. 
HE WENT OVER THE BASIC CONCEPTS THAT HE HAD AND THE BASIC 
- 61 -
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q NOW, DID YOU SEE THE MACHINE OPERATE IN THAT TIME FRAME, 
SAY, FEBRUARY, MARCH 1985? 
A YES, I DID. 
|Q DID YOU EVER HAVE OCCASION TO TIME IT? 
A YES. 
|Q AND WHEN YOU TIMED IT, WHAT DID YOU FIND ITS PRODUCTION 
RATE WAS? 
[A WELL, I WAS ASKED THAT QUESTION EARLIER IN THE 
DEPOSITION, AND AT THAT POINT I COULDN'T REMEMBER. TIMED IT 
IAGAIN FROM THE VIDEO TAPE YOU JUST SAW — 
Q THE VIDEO TAPE WE'VE DISPLAYED HERE? 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. 
A IN FACT, I HAVE TIMED IT AND RE-TIMED IT PROBAPLY 50 
TIMES IN THE LAST WEEK, AND I GET AN AVERAGE OF AROUND 7.14 
SECONDS PER CYCLE. 
Q WHAT DOES THAT — 
|A THAT' S ABOUT 505 PARTS. 
Q PER HOUR? 
!A PER HOUR. 
Q NOW, BASED ON YOUR EXPERTISE AND YOUR EXPERIENCE IN THE 
ENGINEERING FIELD. DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR NG 
THIS PARTICULAR MACHINE 13 WHAT THEY TERM TO BE A CONTINUOUS 
OPERATION TYPE MACHINE? 
lA I BELIEVE THAT TO BE TRUE. HOWEVER, THAT — JUST A 
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1 5 
MINUTE — MACHINE HAS NEVER BEEN OPERATED ON A CONTINUOUS 
(BASIS. CONTINUOUS OPERATION TO ME MEANS THAT THE MACHINE 
ITSELF WILL NOT FAIL. NOT — NOT THAT THE MACHINE WILL NOT 
[FUNCTION ON THE PARTS BEING PRODUCED. YOU' RE TALKING ABOUT A 
CONTINUOUS OPERATION ON THE MACHINE, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE 
[CAPABILITY OF THE MACHINE TO STAND UP UNDER THE WEAR AND TEAR 
OF CONTINUOUS USE. 
[Q WELL, THAT'S ONE OF THE FUNCTIONS IS TO DETERMINE THE 
STRUCTURAL SOUNDNESS OF THIS PARTICULAR MACHINE, ISN'T THAT 
[CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
P AND YOU DID SOME OF THOSE CALCULATIONS WITH REGARD TO 
STRESS AND THE ACTUAL — 
\R THAT'S CORRECT, AND I BELIEVE IT — IN THAT CAPACITY, THE 
MACHINE WILL MEET THAT. BUT THAT'S YET TO BE PROVEN. 
P I SEE. THAT WOULD BE PROVEN BY A TRUE PRODUCTION RUN OR 
SOME OTHER FORM — 
fc THE ONLY WAY YOU CAN EVER PROVE THAT IS TO PUT IT INTO 
FUNCTION AND LET IT RUN WITH AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME AND 
[SEE WHAT WEAR FACTORS YOU GET ON THE WEAR PARTS. TO SEE WHAT 
BREAKAGES YOU WOULD GET ON CRITICAL PARTS. ONLY ONE WAY TO 
[PROVE IT, THAT'S TO RUN THE MACHINE. 
Q NOW. THERE'S BEEN SOME TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE ABOUT THIS 
MACHINE NOT BEING ADAPTED OR CONSTRUCTED FOR CONVENIENT 
SERVICING. REPAIR. AND REPLACEMENT OF COMPONENTS. HAVC "< OU 
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A OVERALL. MAKING SURE THAT THE MACHINE COMPLIES WITH GOOD 
ENGINEERING PRACTICE AND MANUFACTURING, YES. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: THANK YOU. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BLACKBURN: 
Q IF THE MACHINE WASN'T WORKING PROPERLY, THEN YOU CONSIDER 
YOURSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT MACHINE, MR. LINDSEY? 
A I DID NOT CONSIDER MYSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR WHETHER OR NOT 
THE MACHINE WORKS. AGAIN. AS I EXPLAINED TO YOU IN DEPOSITION 
AND TODAY, THAT IS NOT A PART OF THE CERTIFICATION. 
CERTIFICATION ONLY CERTIFIES TO THE STRENGTHS. TO THE PROPER 
CHOICE OF MATERIALS, THE PROPER METHODS — 
Q YOU'VE MADE NO CERTIFICATIONS TO THIS MACHINE BY ANY 
CERTIFIED DRAWINGS, HAVE YOU? 
A I HAVE NOT STAMPED ANY DRAWINGS. I — NOT CERTIFIED IN 
THAT SENSE. 
Q YOU HAVE NOT — 
IA BUT MY APPROVAL IS THE SAME THING. 
Q YOU HAVE NOT MADE ANY DRAWINGS ON THIS PARTICULAR 
MACHINE, ISN'T THAT TRUE? 
A I DON'T ORDINARILY DO DRAFTING, NO. 
|Q ISN'T IT TRUE THAT MR. IREY WOULD DESIGN IT, THEN BRING 
IT TO YOU FOR YOUR REVIEW OF THE ITEMS THAT WERE — YOU'VE 
TALKED ABOUT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT IN MOST CASES. THAT I WOULD REVIEW A 
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DESIGN THAT WAS ALREADY DONE. AND SUGGEST WHATEVEF 
MODIFICATIONS THAT I FELT WERE REQUIRED TO MAKE BETTER USE OF 
MATERIALS OR TO STRENGTHEN A PART OF REQUIRED — IN THAT 
CAPACITY. 
|Q NOW, INITIALLY HE CAME TO YOU AND YOU WENT WITH A CHALK 
BOARD TALK ON THE MACHINE. I GUESS, IS THAT CORRECT? 
|A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q THAT WAS FOR DESIGN OF THE FRAME? 
IA HE INITIALLY CAME TO ME WITH THE ENTIRE CONCEPT. WE 
BROKE IT DOWN INTO VARIOUS FUNCTIONS, LOOKED AT MODULES THAT 
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH IT. 
Q WAS THAT INITIALLY ON THE BLACKBOARD IS HOW YOU DID THAT? 
A YES. 
|Q IN THAT REVIEW PROCESSION — OR THAT PROCESS, WAS 
ANYTHING DESIGNED I GUESS BY MR. IREY AND YOU REVIEWED IT 
(AFTER THAT PROCESS? 
(A OH, I'M SURE THERE WERE A LOT OF CASES WHERE HE MADE THE 
SUGGESTION AND SOME WHERE I MADE THE SUGGESTION. I'M SURE 
[THAT'S POSSIBLE, YES. 
|Q AS I UNDERSTAND, YOU'RE NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF INDUSTRIAL 
ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING? 
|A THAT' S CORRECT. 
b YOU'RE NOT AN OFFICER OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND 
MANUFACTURING? 
P THAT'S CORRECT. 
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0 YOU RECEIVED -- OR DID YOU RECEIVE MONEV FOF THIS 
PARTICULAR — 
A YES. I DID. IN FACT. I DID. I DID. I RECEIVED *£.OdC. 
Q WAS THAT ON THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT"1 
A ON THIS PROJECT, YES. 
Q AND OTHER THAN THAT, YOU TRADED BACK AND FORTH WITH MR. 
IREY-1 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU RECEIVE SOME STOCK IN THE COMPANY"' 
A BACK WHEN WE ORIGINALLY MADE OUR ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN US 
TO — FOR HIM TO USE ME AS A CONSULTANT AND FOR ME TO USE HIM 
AS A CONSULTANT. AT THAT TIME HE OWED ME SOME MONEY FOR SOME 
WORK THAT I HAD ALREADY DONE FOR HIM. SO AS A WAY OF PAYING 
THAT OFF AND AS AN ENTICEMENT TO CONSUMMATE THE AGREEMENT THAT 
WE HAD BETWEEN US, YES, I DID END UP TAKING *40.©OB OF STOCK 
IN THE COMPANY. 
Q DID HE GIVE YOU A STOCK CERTIFICATE FOR THAT STOCK? 
A YES, HE DID. 
Q AND THAT WAS IN EXCHANGE FOR LABOR, NO MONEY TRANSACTED 
ACROSS. IT WAS — HE OWED YOU SOME MONEY AND GAVE YOU THE 
STOCK FOR THE MONEY HE OWED YOU? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q DID YOU EVER MEET WITH ANYBODY AT PACIFIC CHROMOLOX 
CONCERNING THE MACHINE? 
IA NO, I DID NOT. 
_ C6 _ 
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Q DO YOU RECALL WHEN YOU DID THAT? 
A OFF AND ON SEVERAL TIMES THROUGH THE MACHINE'S 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Q WELL, CAN YOU GIVE US ANY DATES, JUST — 
A NO. 
Q — OR TIMES? 
A I COULDN'T. 
Q CAN YOU GIVE US ANY RESULTS? 
A YES. EARLY IN THE MACHINE'S DESIGN, YOU WERE LOOKING AT 
— AND I CAN'T VERIFY THAT AT THIS DATE THAT I TOOK A TEST AND 
IT WAS THIS MANY SECONDS. BUT THE COLLECTIVE IMPRESSION FROM 
SEVERAL TESTS WAS THAT THE MACHINE WAS OPERATING DOWN AROUND 
£00, £50 PARTS PER HOUR FOR — I WOULD SAY ABOUT ' 83, ' 84, 
THROUGH THERE. 
Q CAN YOU REMEMBER HOW MANY PARTS WERE PUT THROUGH THE 
MACHINE TO DETERMINE YOUR PROJECTION IN '83 AND '84 AT £00, 
£50 PARTS? 
A I NE^ER SAW MORE THAN, SAY, £0 TO 30 COILS PUN AT A TIME. 
Q DID VOU SEE DIFFERENT TYPE GAUGE COILS AND DIFFERENT SIZE 
DIAMETER COILS RUN OR WERE THEY ALL THE SAME SIZE? 
A I NEVER MEASURED THEM TO SEE WHAT SIZE THEY WERE. THE 
IC0IL3 THAT DICK HAD AT HIS SHOP TO TEST I THINK WERE MOSTLY OF 
THE MIDDLE RUN SIZES. IT'S BEEN TESTIFIED HERE THAT THOSE 
FELL IN THE £5, £6 GAUGE RANGE. I NEVER FELT IT WAS MY PLACE 
TO GO INTO HIS SHOP ^ND MEASURE ANY QF THOSE COILS MYSELF. I 
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S3 
IWOULD RELY UPON HIM. 
Q SO AS TO DIFFERENT GAUGE COILS, DIFFERENT SIZE DIAMETERS, 
DIFFERENT LENGTHS, YOU PERFORMED NO PROJECTION TEST WITH THOSE 
IOTHER THAN THE ONES YOU OBSERVED HIM HAVING IN THE SHOP WHICH 
ARE THE — I GUESS THE £5. £4. ££ AREA? 
(A I NEVER CONDUCTED ANY TESTS WITH THE MACHINE. 
Q OKAY. 
A WHETHER IT WAS RUNNING IT OR TIMING OR ANYTHING ELSE, 
OTHER THAN — OTHER THAN THE TIME SEQUENCES THAT I WATCHED 
JMY5ELF AND VOLUNTARILY TIMED. I HAVE OBSERVED SEVERAL OF THE 
MODULES IN MODULAR FUNCTION ON THE BENCH, AND I WAS THERE A 
NUMBER OF TIMES WHEN SOMEONE ELSE WAS OPERATING THE MACHINE, 
BUT I NEVER RAN THE MACHINE. 
|Q MAYBE I ASKED YOU THIS, I APOLOGIZE, DID YOU MAKE ANY 
DRAWINGS OR DESIGNS AT ALL FOR THE MACHINE? 
|A NOT DIRECTLY, NO. 
|Q DO YOU REMEMBER ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS THAT DICK WAS HAVING 
WITH THE MACHINE AS IT WAS BEING BUILT? 
|A YES. 
D WHAT WERE THOSE PROBLEMS? 
A THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF COURSE WITH THE ORIENTER. I SAY 
MAJOR PROBLEMS. MAJOR IN THE SENSE THAT IT WAS AN ONGOING 
STRUGGLE. I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY PROBLEM THERE THAT I 
IWOULD SAY WAS MAJOR IN THE SENSE THAT I DIDN'T FEEL THAT IT 
COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED OR THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH 
68 
APPENDIX C Reporter's Transcript 
p. 3 through 7, 16 through 20 
R E P u R T E R ' Z T R A N S C R I P T 
1 
2 
•* I P A C I F I C C H K C I ' I U L . . ; .. ± > J. _ i i_ 
EMERSON Ci_ECTF.IC CGI..'-
4 
P L A I N T IF . " 
5 
6 
RICHARD r. IRE'i' AND iNDUS7RIA_ . CIVIL NE. 
1 | ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING ) 
CORPORATION. ; 
8 I ) 
DEFENDANTS. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
_ 70 -
D E A N C. O L S E N . C. S . R. 
6 0 5 MUNICIPAL BLOC. 
DGDEN, UTAH S4401 
399-B51D 
BE I~ REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY 
FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLGUIST, JUDGE, 
SITTING WITH H JURY AT DGDEN, UTAI-' ON THE iGTH. 13TH. 1GTH, 
AND 17TH DAYS OF- NOVEMBER iSC7. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD. TO WIT: 
••-•**••>- + 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN 
FOR THE DEFENDANT. E. H. FANKHAUSER 
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PLAINTIFF". IN ORDER FOR THEM TO DO THAT. AND THEY HAVE 
ALLEGED THAT THE CORPORATION WAS A SHAM AND A FRAUD. AND HERE 
AGAIN. THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT THAT 
THAT IS THE SITUATION HERE AT ALL. AND I WOULD MOVE THE COURT 
THAT THESE MATTERS BE DISMISSED. FURTHER. THE BURDEN WITH 
REGARD TO THE SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF MUST BE CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE RATHER THAN A MERE PREPONDERANCE. AND I 
BELIEVE I WOULD ADDRESS THE COURT TO THE DOCKSTADER CASE, 
WHICH SAYS YOU MUST PROVE THAT THE CORPORATION ENTITY WAS 
USED, QUOTE. UNQUOTE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PERPETRATING A FRAUD 
OR SOME OTHER TYPE OF INJURY OR TORT IN ORDER TO PIERCE THE 
[CORPORATE VEIL, AND THAT MUST BE PROVED BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. BASED ON THAT WE ASK THOSE TWO CLAIMS BE 
[DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
MR. BLACKBURN: WE HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: GRANT BOTH MOTIONS. 
MR. BLACKBURN: YOUR HONOR. AT THIS TIME WE WOULD MAKE A 
|MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF — EXCUSE ME, DEFENDANTS1 
COUNTERCLAIM BASED UPON SECTION 58-££-£0, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
(WHICH READS THIS: nNO PERSON SHALL BRING OR MAINTAIN ANY 
ACTION IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ANY 
(CONTRACT OR THE RECOVER OF ANY SUMS DUE IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
PRACTICE OF ENGINEERING OR LAND SURVEYING IN THIS STATE AS 
pEFINED HEREIN WITHOUT ALLEGING AND PROVING THAT HE WAS DULY 
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT, AND 
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NO FIRM. CO-PARTNERSHIl. C O R P G K M T I Or J Oi: _GlN7 £7GL. 
ASSOCIATION SHALL BRING OR MAINTAIN ANY ACTION IN THE COURTS 
OF THIS STATE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ANY CONTRACT OR THE RECOVERY 
OF ANY SUMS DUE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRACTICE OF ENGINEERING 
OR LAND SURVEYING IN THIS STATE AS DEFINED HEREIN WITHOUT 
ALLEGING AND PROVING THAT SUCH PRACTICE WAS CARRIED ON BY 
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS OR LAND SURVEYORS RESPECTIVELY 
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT." 
THERE'S NO ALLEGATION IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM THAT THE 
CORPORATION — THAT THERE'S ANY AUTHORIZED ENGINEERS LICENSED 
TO PRACTICE ENGINEERING IN THIS STATE IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM — 
THE COURT: JUST A MOMENT. WASN'T THIS MOTION 
PRESENTED TO THE OTHER JUDGE'1 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO. THE MOTION BEFORE THE OTHER JUDGE 
WAS SIMPLY THAT THE — THERE WAS NO ENGINEERING. IT WAS THAT 
THE — THERE WAS NOT AN ENGINEER. IT WAS NOT THAT THEY DID 
NOT ALLEGE IT IN THEIR COMPLAINT. WE DIDN'T BRING IT AT THAT 
TIME BECAUSE PERHAPS THEY COULD HAVE AMENDED IT. THERE IS NO 
ALLEGATION IN THEIR COMPLAINT. THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT, 
WHETHER THERE WAS A LICENSED ENGINEER WORKING FOR THE COMPANY, 
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ALLEGING IT IN THEIR COMPLAINT. NO 
ALLEGATION WHATSOEVER IN THE COUNTERCLAIM. THEY'RE BARRED FROM 
MAINTAINING AN ACTION BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE THAT ALLEGATION 
IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY RESPOND. 
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MK. FANKHAUSER: Ucii tUJI --J. .01.. I LISAGf-ZZ *JlTn COUNSEL 
ON THAT RESPECT. NUMbZf- OnL -- I'M LOOKING TOR 1 HE MEMORANDUM 
WHICH WE SUBMITTED; HOWEVER. THEY'RE ON FILE. THIS MATTER WAS 
JARGUED bV SUMMAR\ JUDGMENT MOT I Of, bEFORE JUDGE ROTH AND IT WAS 
DENIED AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME. FURTHERMORE. COUNSEL WAS WELL 
PLACED ON NOTICE OF THAT PARTICULAR DEFENSE. ALTHOUGH WE DID 
NOT FORMALLY MODIFY OUR COUNTERCLAIM TO ALLEGE THAT. IT'S OUR 
[POSITION AS SET FORTH IN THE COUNTERCLAIM THAT THAT IS NOT 
NECESSARY WHERE THIZ IS NOT A PARTY, QUOTE. LND QUOTE. THAT IS 
INTENDED TO BE PROTECTED UNDER THE STATUTE. WHAT YOU HAVE 
HERE IS YOU HAVE TWO CORPORATIONS. BOTH ENGAGED IN THE 
MANUFACTURING FIELD. NEITHER ONE OF THOSE CORPORATIONS ARE 
DOING THEIR WORK FOR THE GENERAL LAY PUBLIC PER SE. CHROMOLOX 
IS PRODUCING THEIR OWN UNITS FOR THEIR OWN CUSTOMERS. WHICH 
ARE INDUSTRIAL. INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING IS PRODUCING WHATEVER 
IT PRODUCES FOR. QUOTE. END QUOTE. INDIVIDUAL SPECIALIZED 
CUSTOMERS. AND THEREFORE. IT'S NOT THIS PARTICULAR STATUTE. 
|WE COME WITHIN SOME OF THE EXEMPTIONS SET FORTH IN OUR 
MEMORANDUM. ALL THAT WAS ARGUED AT THE TIME OF SUMMARY 
(JUDGMENT BEFORE JUDGE ROTH. E^EN IF IT WASN'T, I WOULD MOVE 
THE COURT AT THIS POINT TO AMEND THE COUNTERCLAIM TO CONFORM 
[TO THE MOTIONS AND THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH WERE ARGUED 
BEFORE. WHICH WOULD PUT THIS IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE — ARE YOU GOING TO HAVE 
EVIDENCE THAT THERE ARE EMPLOYED LICENSED ENGINEERS ON IN THIS 
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!C7MJ?L" I.\ >LJJI"- CAbZ IN CHIC; "" 
MF>. FANKHAUSER: YES. I HAVE MR. LINDSEY. AND IF 
NECESSARY, WE CAN BRING IN MR. ROBERT GRIFFIN WHO WAS ALSO 
CONSULTED AND THE PERSON WHO IS A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL 
ENGINEER. MR. LINDSEY IS A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER WHO 
IS A STOCKHOLDER OF THE CORPORATION. WHO WAS CONSULTED AND HAS 
BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS PROJECT FROM ITS OUTSET. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY RESPOND. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: AN AFFIDAVIT IS ON FILE FROM MR. LINDSEY 
TO THAT EFFECT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: MR. IREY'S INCORRECT. EVEN IF YOU'RE 
ALLEGING THAT IT COMES UNDER THE EXEMPTION. THE LAW REQUIRES 
THAT YOU PLEAD THE EXEMPTION IN THE CASE. THE ONLY ISSUE THAT 
WAS BEFORE JUDGE ROTH WAS WHETHER A LICENSED ENGINEER WAS 
PARTICIPATING. AND JUDGE ROTH SAID THERE WAS A FACTUAL ISSUE. 
THE CASE IS WHERE THEY HAVE TO PLEAD THAT AND IT MUST BE PLED 
IN THE COMPLAINT, IT CANNOT BE AMENDED NOW. BUT IT MUST BE 
PLED IN THE COMPLAINT. A PERSON SEEKING RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL 
SERVICE FOR WHICH A LICENSE IS REQUIRED AS A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT TO THE RENDITION THEREOF FOR A FEE MUST ALLEGE AND 
PROVE FACTS WHICH SHOW HE WAS LICENSED AT THE TIME SUCH 
SERVICES WERE PERFORMED OR HE WAS EXEMPT FROM THE CLASS 
REQUIRED TO HAVE SUCH LICENSE. THAT MUST BE SPECIFICALLY PLED 
AND IT MUST BE SPECIFICALLY PROVEN. THERE IS NO PLEADING ON 
IFILE WITH THIS COURT THAT PLEADS THAT AT ALL. AND THEY CANNOT 
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i | i 
MAINTAIN A CLAIM U\lLE't THAT WITHOUT r-uEAL>lNu . : FIRST. IT'Z-
VERY CLEAR FROM THE STATUTE IN' THE CASE. 
THE COURT: THE COURT IS SOMEWHAT FAMILIAR WITH THE 
FILE. THE COURT NOTES THAT PROCEEDINGS TOOK PLACE IN FRONT OF 
THE OTHER DISTRICT COURT, AND BELIEVES THAT IN SUBSTANCE THE 
SAME ISSUE WHICH IS HERE PRESENTED WAS PRESENTED THERE. BOTH 
SIDES WERE PUT ON NOTICE AT THAT TIME THAT THE — IT WAS 
DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION THAT THEY1RE PREPARED TO PROVE THAT A 
LICENSED ENGINEER WAS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE ARTICLE 
IN QUESTION. FOR THIS REASON, THE COURT WILL DENY THE MOTION. 
IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO. YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: LET ME ALSO, WHILE I HAVE THE JURY OUT 
|FOR A MINUTE, I NOTE THAT — I BELIEVE IT'S JUDGE HYDE GAVE AN 
ORDER AND THE MACHINE IS NOW IN PLAINTIFF'S POSSESSION, IS 
UHftT TRUE? 
MR. BLACKBURN: IT'S NOT IN OUR POSSESSION. IT'S IN THE 
SHERIFF'S POSSESSION IN A WAREHOUSE. I MEAN WE DON'T HAVE IT, 
IT'S IN A WAREHOUSE. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: WELL, THE SHERIFF DOESN'T HAVE 
POSSESSION. THEY'RE RENTING THE WAREHOUSE. THEY'RE PAYING THE 
[BILL. AND THEY HAVE THE KEY. THE SHERIFF HAS — IS NOT 
(HOLDING IT UNDER ANY WRIT THAT I'M AWARE OF. IT WAS ORDERED 
(BY JUDGE HYDE THAT IT REMAIN THERE UNLESS IT COULD BE WORKED 
OUT BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT. 
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ANYTHING ELSE* 
MR. BLACKBURN: YES. THE THIRD MOTION IS. AGAIN. IS BACK 
TO THE LICENSED ENGINEERING. WE'VE MADE H MOTION ALREADY AND 
WE WOULD REINSTITUTE THE MOTION CONCERNING THAT THE COMPLAINT 
HAS NOT ALLEGED THAT A LICENSED ENGINEER AS REQUIRED BY THE 
STATUTE, AND THE COURT'S PREVIOUSLY RULED ON THAT. BUT I'M 
REIN3TITUTING THAT MOTION AT THIS TIME. BUT ALSO THAT THEY 
HAVE NOT PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT A LICENSED ENGINEER 
MANUFACTURED THIS DOCUMENT. THE ONLY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
COURT IS THAT A CERTIFIED ENGINEER REVIEWED THE PLANS AND 
REVIEWED THE DESIGNS. HE NEVER CONSULTED WITH PACIFIC 
CHROMOLOX, HE NEVER ENTERED INTO ANY AGREEMENTS, HE NEVER 
CERTIFIED OR DREW ANY PLANS, NEVER CONSULTED OR REVIEWED WITH 
|A COMPLAINT, AND IT WAS ALL ON A LABOR TRADING BASIS. THIS IS 
SIMILAR TO SOMEONE GOING TO AN ATTORNEY AND HAVING THE 
ATTORNEY REVIEW DOCUMENTS AND HAVING THAT INDIVIDUAL GO 
FORWARD AND DOING THEM WITHOUT THE ATTORNEY EVER SIGNING THEM. 
AND THAT'S JUST NOT WHAT THE STATUTE IS TRYING TO PROTECT. IT 
SHOULD BE THE OTHER WAY AROUND. MR. IREY SHOULD BE WORKING 
FOR MR. LINDSEY AND NOT THE OPPOSITE WAY AROUND. AND MR. 
LINDSEY SHOULD BE THE ONE THAT'S INVOLVED IN THIS. HE 
INDICATED THAT HE HAD NOT TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
MACHINE. THAT HE SAID HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PARTS THAT HE 
(LOOKED AT, AND THAT WAS THE STRUCTURE OF THE DESIGN. BUT 
THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE MANUFACTURING 
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" r-,:L I'iHu lul UJHL-RL r-i_ WAI DOIIM- *i. THE DNL-V EVIDENCE, I 
GUEL-o THERE*: SQhE EVIDENCE, I H H T ' L THE 140 HOURS HE WORKED ON 
THE MACHINE THROUGH HIS TESTIMONY'. AND I SUBMIT THAT THEY CAN 
ONLY' RECOVER THE 140 HOURS THAT MR. LINDSEN WORKED ON THE 
MACHINE UNDER THAT PARTICULAR STATUTE. 
THE COURT: YOU MAV COMMENT. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I BELIEVE. YOUR HONOR. THE BURDEN OF THE 
STATUTE'S BEEN MET UNEQUIVOCALLY IN TWO RESPECTS. NUMBER ONE, 
THE CORPORATION DID NOT ALLEGE TO BE A PROFESSIONAL. ENGINEER 
BECAUSE A CORPORATION OBVIOUSLY' CANNOT BE THAT. NUMBER TWO, 
THE STATUTE PROVIDES THAT IF YOU ARE A CORPORATION, THAT YOU 
MUST SHOW THAT THE ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED EITHER 
BY A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER OR UNDER THE SUPERVISION 
!OR IN CONCERT WITH A LICENSED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER. THE 
EVIDENCE IS UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNCONTRADICTED IN THAT RESPECT. 
FURTHERMORE, THE STATUTE DOESN'T REQUIRE THAT THAT ENGINEER BE 
COMPENSATED. I DON'T THINK THE STATUTE SETS THE CONTRACT 
(UNDER WHICH THE PEOPLE WANT TO WORK, THAT'S IMMATERIAL. 
THIRDLY. THE HOURS THAT MR. LINDSEY TESTIFIED TO WAS 
(APPROXIMATELY £80, 140 ON THE MODIFICATION. THEREFORE, I 
THINK THAT'S APPROPRIATE. AND HE WORKED ON THOSE 
(MODIFICATIONS, HE APPROVED THOSE THINGS, AND I THINK THAT THE 
STATUTE'S BURDEN HAS BEEN MET NOT ONLY WITH A MERE 
PREPONDERANCE, BUT WITH A SUBSTANTIAL PREPONDERANCE, AND I 
THINK THE MOTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
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f-!;-.. BL-HCKBUKI-.: JUST Tu Bnli-FLY RESPOND. Mk. i_INDSEY IS 
r>IO" AN EMPLOYEE OF THE COMPANY. HE'S NOT HN OFFICER OF THE 
COMPANY. HE'S NOT A DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY. HE'S A 
STOCKHOLDER OF THE COMPANY, THE SAME AS THE JUDGE IS PROBABLY 
A STOCKHOLDER IN SOME COMPANIES. THE SAME AS I'M A STOCKHOLDER 
IN SOME COMPANIES. BUT HE'S NOT AN OFFICER. HE'S NOT A 
DIRECTOR, HE'S NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THAT PARTICULAR COMPANY. HE 
DOLSN'T WORK FOR THEM. WHAT THAT STATUTE MEANS IS THE 
LICENSED ENGINEER WILL BE AN EMPLOYEE. OFFICER. OR DIRECTOR OF 
THE CGMPANi. THIS COMPANY HAS NQ LICENSED ENGINEER WITH IT AT 
ALL, AS TESTIFIED TO BY MR. LINDSEY. HE WAS ONLY THERE TO 
CONSULT BECAUSE THEY'RE IN THE SAME BUILDING. HE'S NOT PART 
OF THAT CORPORATION AT ALL. 
THE COURT: THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION. THE COURT 
DOES SO FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: FIRST OF ALL, THE COURT 
BELIEVES THAT THE MATTER'S ALREADY BEEN RULED ON BY ANOTHER 
JUDGE. AND THEREFORE. IS THE LAW OF THE CASE. BUT IN ADDITION 
THERETO, THE COURT RULES THAT THE MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED, 
FIRST OF ALL. THE CORPORATION — THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE WHICH 
I HAVE BEFORE ME IS THAT THE CORPORATION DID HAVE AVAILABLE TO 
IT THE SERVICES OF LICENSED ENGINEERS WHO WERE CONCERNED WITH 
THE CONSTRUCTION AND WERE COUNSELED ON THE MATTER. IN 
ADDITION TO THIS, I BELIEVE THE EARLIER JUDGE HAS RULED THAT 
THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY ONE OF THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE YOU ARE 
INVOLVED IN PROTECTION OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC. BUT IS — THIS 
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19 
IS A SITUATION WHERE YOU'RE IMVU^vEL- ii-« 7hl 7ECHNICH- DEALINGS 
JOF C0RPGRA7IGN5. BOTH OF WHlCh HAVE 7 H E L>Er.ViL"EE OF TRAINED 
ENGINEERS. IE THERE ANYTHING FURTHER" 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO, YOUR HONOR. THAT-E OUR MOTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK 
|AT THESE INSTRUCTIONS SO YOU CAN TAKE YOUR EXCEPTIONS AND 
WE'LL BE READY TO GO WITH THE JURY WHEN THEY COME BACK? 
MR. FANKHAUSER: THE ONES WE HAD THIS MORNING, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I HAVEN1T SEEN ANY UPDATES. 
THE COURT: HERE THEY ARE. 
MR. BLACKBURN: NO, I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK AT 
THESE. 
THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, I GAVE THEM TO YOU LAST 
NIGHT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: THESE WEREN'T — 
MR. FANKHAUSER: WE JUST GOT THEM NOW. 
THE COURT: JUST THE TWO WORDS CHANGED IS ALL. 
MR. BLACKBURN: OKAY. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: YOU INDICATED, YOUR HONOR, THAT YOU'RE 
IGOING TO ADD MAYBE ONE OR TWO. DID YOU DO THAT? 
THE COURT: I DID NOT ADD — DECIDED NOT TO ADD THEM. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: IN OTHER WORDS, YOU JUST MADE THE WORD 
(CHANGES? 
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THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: GKHV. I COULD TAKE ftI ML. I'M READY TO 
TAKE MY EXCEPTIONS. 
THE COURT; ALL RIGHT. 
MR. BLACKBURN: ONE OF OUR CAUSES OF ACTION IS FOR BREACH 
OF WARRANTY. THERE'S NO INSTRUCTION IN HERE CONCERNING BREACH 
OF WARRANTY FOR THE JURY TO RULE ON. SO WE EXCEPT TO IT, THE 
LACKING OF THIS INSTRUCTION. WE SUBMITTED ONE TO THE COURT ON 
BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY TAKE YOUR EXCEPTIONS. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: AS I UNDERSTAND IT, WAS THE INSTRUCTION 
ON PROXIMATE CAUSE REMOVED? 
THE COURT: YES, TOOK ONE OUT. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: OKAY. THE DEFENDANT WOULD OBJECT TO THE 
NON GIVING OF THE INSTRUCTION REGARDING REASONABLE VALUE OF 
LABOR PERFORMED. ALSO TO THE NON-GIVING OF AN INSTRUCTION AS 
TO ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF, WHERE IT 
REMOVED THE MACHINE FROM THE CUSTODY OF THE DEFENDANT AND HAS 
WITHHELD THE MACHINE FROM THE DEFENDANT SINCE THAT TIME, AND I 
THINK THAT THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING THE JURY SHOULD CONSIDER 
REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN MET TO THE 
lEXTENT THAT IT WAS — THE DEFENDANT WAS ABLE TO PERFORM. AND 
THAT GOES TO THE ISSUE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT. I THINK THERE 
[SHOULD BE AN INSTRUCTION ON MEETING OF THE MINDS RELATIVE TO, 
QUOTE, END QUOTE. THE MODIFICATIONS AND CHANGES TO THESE 
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Exhibit 4OP 
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DAMAGES 
(Amounts paid by Plaintiff to Defendant 
and for Defendant's behalf) 
Purchase Price of Automatic Terminal 
Bolt to Coil Assembly Machine S73.389.75 
Invoice #S6049 Date: 10/27/83 1,512.60 
Invoice #S6049-A Date: 11/10/83 503.84 
Lease-A-Matic Colorado Co. 6,542.68 
Amount paid by Plaintiff to 
Defendant and for Plaintiff $81,948.87 
Lease damage in transit 1,500.00 
Less centering devise 1,500.00 
Total amount owed to Plaintiff 
by Defendant $78,948.87 
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[J EXHIBIT 
4*0 P 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of 
August, 1988, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief were hand delivered, postage prepaid, 
to E.H. Fankhauser, attorney for Respondent, at 243 
East 4th South, Suite 200, Salt £»*»*£i.ty, Utah 84111. 
RON R. KUNZLER 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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